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STATEMENT OF CASE AND DISPOSITION OF LCWER COURT 
The issue of this case is whether or not Section 78-12-35, UCA, as amended, 
tolled the Statute of Limitations while the Defendant was out of the State of Utah. 
Respondent claims it did. Appellant claims it did not. 
Respondent filed her suit against the Appellant within a short time after he re-
turned to Utah, seeking Judgjuent on what she alleged was due her. There is no dispute 
regarding the facts. The lower Court awarded Judgjnent to the Respondent and the 
Appllent appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT 
Respondent seeks to have Judgment of Trial Court sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute as to the material facts in this case, which are: 
1. Respondent obtained three Judgments against the Appellant which were entered 
in the records of the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, in and for 
Uintah County, in Civil No. 4472, herein Appellant was Plaintiff was Respondent was 
Defendant. These Judgjnents were entered on June 30, 1964, October 6, 1964, and Dec-
ember 22, 1964. 
2. The Respondent by executions duly issued, obtained a few small payments on on 
of the Judgments due her from her former husband, but other attempted executions faile 
3. The Appellant, according to his own testimony, left the State of Utah on June 
30, 1965, and returned to Utah on June 25, 1974, being out of the state, except for 
intermittent visits, for nine years, less five days. 
4. On April 4, 1975, after Appellant returned to Utah and within the term limite 
by the statute after his return, Respondent filed this action, a new case, and Summons 
was issued and served on the Appellant in Uintah County, State of Utah. Said suit was 
brought on three Judgements (not to execute on the Judgments) to obtain a new Judgment 
based on the old Judgments. 
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5. Respondent's position was that the Appellant's absence from the State of 
Utah for the nearly nine year period, tolled the Statute of Limitation and she was 
entitled to Judgpaent on her new cause of action. 
6. The Respondent testified that she was unable to locate the Appellant 
during the period of time he was out of the State of Utah and did not knew of 
his visits in Uintah County except for one occasion when he came to the County 
to attend the funeral of his mother. On this occasion Respondent testified she 
felt it inappropriate to serve him with Surmois at that time. 
7. Upon learning of the Appellants return to Utah, Respondent filed a new 
suit against him (this case) based on the three old Judgpnents. 
8. The lewer Court gave Judgment to the Respondent for the amount of the 
Judgments plus legal interest thereon, from which Appellant makes this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
Respondent contends that the statute of limitations with reference to a suit 
based on existing Judgments is tolled during the time the Judgpaent-debtor is out 
of the state. 
Section 78-12-35, UGA, as amended, provides: 
"Effect of Absence from state-If when a cause of action accrues 
against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be 
conmenced within the term herein limited after his return to the 
state; and if after a cause of action accrues he departs from the 
state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited 
for the comnencement of the action." 
We find no case in the State of Utah which provides otherwise. Appellant cites 
Rule 69 (a) which Respondent urges has no application in this case but involves a 
Writ of Execution. The case new before this Court and tried by the lewer Court was 
not brought for the purpose of executing on the old Judgjnents, but was a suit to renew 
the old Judgments and not to enforce the payment of it. The Appellant was out of the 
State of Utah for nine years, lacking a few days, which Appellant admits. Respondent 
contends that under the provisions of Sec. 78-12^35, the statute of limitations was 
tolled during the time Appellant was absent from the state. 
The Trial Court h$ld in the case new before this Court, that Rule 69 (a) provides 
a limitation on the use of execution to enforce e Judgprent not upon a suit brought 
upon. Judgment. (See Memorandum Decision). Respondent contends that this is the law. 
51 AnJur 2d, 162 quoting a Missouri case, states: 
"In determining Aether a case is within a statutory exception 
vfaich is that the Plaintiff should not lose his of action 
by the bar of the statute of limitations if during any substan-
tial period of time during which the statute otherwise would 
have been running, the Defendant had departed from, or resided 
out of, the state, so that ordinary legal process such as would 
afford a foundation for a personal Judgment against the Defen-
dant could not be served upon him. 
Shortly after his return to the State of Utah, Respondent filed suit and obtained 
Judgment well within the period the statute was tolled. 
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In the case of Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P 2d 915, this Court held; 
nThe objective of the statute providing that the limitations 
are tolled if the Defendant departs from the state was to 
prevent Defendant from depriving Plaintiff of opportunity 
of suing while absenting himself from the state during 
limitation period.n 
This case also held: 
"It is obvious that the objective of the statute "tolling the 
statute of limitations in the premises" above quoted was to 
prevent a Defendant from depriving a Plaintiff of the oppor-
tunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state during 
the period of limitation" 
The Court then cited UCA 1953, 78-12-35 as the law in Utah. 
The case of Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Company, 64 Utah 391, 231 P 123 held: 
1
'Where the Defendant was out of the state for a period of five 
months. His absence tolled the statute for this period, not-
withstanding he maintained residence in state with persons re-
siding in Utah, upon whom service of process might be made." 
We have found no case holding to the contrary. 
The law has long been established that a debtors absence from the state tolls 
the statute of limitations while he is out of the state. 
In the case of Keith O'Brien Company v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P 954 held: 
!tWhen the cause of action against a debtor accrues against a 
person, he is out of the state, the action may be commenced 
within the term limited after his rettpm to the state." 
This rule was followed by the Trial Court in the case now before the Court, the 
Judgment Appellant appeals from. 
There are numerous other Utah cases upholding the Utah statute, Section 78-12-35, 
which sustains Respondents contention but need not be cited. 
The basic reason for the statute tolling the statute of limitations is to prevent 
a Judgment-debtor, as in this case, from leaving the state purposely in order to prever 
the Judgment-creditor from bringing suit within the period of limitation. 
Appellant apparently is attempting to consider this case as an Execution rather 
than a suit on the old Judgments and cites Section 78-12-22, which applies to the 
situation vfaere the Judgjuent-creditor is endeavoring to enforce the Judgment but, certa 
for the reasons above stated, does not apply where the statute has been tolled. 
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CONCLUSION 
Under the facts of this case, which both parties agree to, the statute of 
limitations was tolled for over eight years. Respondent brought suit soon after 
Appellant returned to the State of Utah, well within the tolled period, suing on 
the old Judgments for her cause of action. The Trial Court gave her Judgment as 
prayed for. This Judgment followed the law and the cases and should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted: 
COLTON & HAMMOND 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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